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Introduction by Peter H. Hoffenberg, University of Hawai‘i at Manoa 
eeking the creators of “modernity?” What could be more modern than that quest? And what quest could 
more poignantly remind us of individual and collective “limits?” 
Jon ares Davidann’s latest scholarly monograph reminds us how elusive, yet inevitable and enduring, that 
pilgrimage and its consequences have been, regardless of whether the authors we read are in ‘e West,’ or 
‘e East.’ e Limits of Westernization: American and East Asian Intellectuals Create Modernity, 1860-1960, 
published in the “Routledge Series in Modern History,” embraces those intellectual pilgrims on both sides of 
the Pacific Ocean to suggest that the multiple sources of that philosophical DNA strand. Like Don Quixote, 
Dr. Davidann’s key historical figures gird themselves with intellectual, political, cultural and sometimes 
avowedly nationalist armor, only to find the windmills continuing to turn and turn and turn, the tilting at 
them nearly endless. In this case, the windmills continue to move.  
Who ever said that modernity was fair? Just as Miguel de Cervantes’s most famous character seems baked into 
our collective social psyche, the same might be said about those in China, Japan and the United States who 
have pursued since the middle of the Victorian era what it means to be modern and the very powerful, 
dangerous, seductive and uplifting consequences of that modernity. Be wary of that Pandora’s Box, those who 
rediscovered the Latin authors during the Renaissance well realized, at least five centuries before Davidann 
wrote his book.1 
Davidann is well-positioned to swim in these choppy waters. His long-term scholarship, teaching, and 
archival research have brought to the fore profound questions of international intellectual history and what is 
now called ‘cultural diplomacy.’2 His books and articles have generally focused on those matters in light of the 
United States and East Asia, Japan as well as China, but primarily in terms of Japanese-American connections. 
Casting his nets a bit wider this time, Davidann re-crossed the Rubicon of the year 1900 to delve into 
developments after the middle of the nineteenth century. His extensive bibliography represents time and labor 
in key archives with manuscript collections, as well as an exhaustive foray into secondary sources. As a true 
intellectual historian, he in many cases read secondary sources as primary ones, generating an argument in the 
wider intellectual strand. at undoubtedly holds true also for the texts which were popular, university 
textbooks, and part of a more general discussion in the United States about “modern” Japan and China. In 
the course of writing this book, Davidan read widely, learned widely, and those admirable characteristics are 
clear and present. 
is bold and well-written book asks its readers to rethink some of the assumptions shaping common claims 
about the chronology, unequal partnerships, and political relations in the modernization of East Asia and the 
United States. All of those terms are used rather broadly; East Asia does not include Korea, and the work 
                                                     
1 Stephen Greenblatt, e Swerve: How the World Became Modern (New York: W.W. Norton, 2011). 
2 Among the helpful studies of “cultural diplomacy” are Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Soft Power: e Means to Success in 
World Politics, new edition (New York: PublicAffairs, 2005) and Jessica C. E. Gienow-Hecht and Mark C. Donfried, 
eds., Searching for a Cultural Diplomacy (Explorations in Culture and International History, 1st ed. (New York: Berghahn 
Books, 2010). 
 
S 
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cannot but be selective about which American thinkers to emphasize.3 Davidann stretches the calendar so that 
we can better understand the impact of the nineteenth-century discussions of being modern on the post-1945 
story with which many are familiar. is is a helpful history of the history of “modernity,” and how that term 
has always meant different things, sometimes at the same time and place.4 e earlier years provide an 
important pre-history to the twentieth-century history of Westernization and modernization, as sets of ideas 
and public policies, and an important gesture towards the role of industrialization in those movements. is 
longer-view provokes the powerful argument that those discussions were often not solely in terms of ‘the 
West,’ or ‘Westernization,’ but in terms of China’s or Japan’s own past, or at least how those pasts were 
understood by Chinese and Japanese philosophes. Here we have an explosion of the chronological and 
temporal “limits.” 
Although those are bold enough claims and well worthy of serious engagement, Davidann also argues that the 
network of intellectual influences went both ways: ideas and philosophers from the West picked up important 
concepts and developments from the East, again using those clumsy terms in the ways that orthodox 
Orientalists and Occidentalists would use them. Not only are there significant non-American ideas about 
modernity, but those East Asian ideas might have actually influenced some American thinkers, John Dewey 
and W. E. B. Dubois among them. “[I]deas flowed in both directions” (55) and between Japan and China, as 
well. As noted by the scholars below, that thesis about “transpacific dialogues” (in the words of Sarah Griffith) 
is not only of great interest, but also one calling out for further study. “East Asian concepts” (x) shaped 
national, regional and, for want of a better term, pan-Pacific modernities. ese were not always peaceful 
interactions, and global historians might discern a potential clash of modernities, rather than the infamous 
‘clash of civilizations.’ e “distinctive power and dynamism of East Asian modernity” (1) can be separated 
from civilizational references, which more often than not shut down discussion and obscure historical and 
contemporary realities. 
Comparing modernities opens up transnational and global conversations. As Davidann points out, this 
comparison as such allows scholars to unlink or rethink terms and processes commonly known as 
‘Westernization’ and ‘modernization,’ which had been and continue to be inter-changeable in many 
discussions. ey are not synonyms in Davidann’s view. He challenges the easy and automatic “conflation of 
westernization and modernity,” (16) as he does the equally easy and automatic “conflation” of American 
influence, if not dominance, of the path to modernity. It was not solely surveyed, paved or travelled upon by 
the Americans or those who listened to them. ere is a lesson for today’s modernizers here, whether they 
come from the West, or the East, are active in Beijing, or Washington, or Moscow: do not think you are 
playing alone and do not be too arrogant about your influence. 
ere is a lot in this book, in part because it is intended for both generalists and specialists, as will be noted 
below in the solicited scholarly reviews. Some readers will be introduced to figures of whom they have never 
                                                     
3 Korean modernization would make a fascinating comparison with the subjects covered in this book, as it 
offers a rather unusual synthesis: indigenous, Asian via Japanese colonialism, and Western via Protestant Christianity. 
at was quite an explosive cocktail. 
4 “e word modernity is now [early 2000’s] used to make so many different points that continued deployment 
of it may contribute more to confusion than to clarity.” Frederick Cooper, “Modernity,” Colonialism in Question: eory, 
Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 113. 
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heard; others might find some of the introductory material knowledge already well known. Some participants 
find this topic right up their proverbial intellectual alley, while others admit interest in the topic, but come at 
it from a different type of history or region. is diversity helps us better understand the book and the 
questions it raises, and also helps us generate a conversation across occasionally rigid academic walls. I think 
that this is the case because this is not only a study of the intellectual creation of what we term ‘modernity,’ 
but also a study in more general terms about how powerful ideas and discourses are created and develop not 
only legitimacy, but enduring traction. Global ideas and discourses rarely, if ever, gain that traction if they are 
only generated from the social and political outside, or inside. at misunderstanding was at the heart of the 
intellectual tragedy of the Cold War. 
To these ends, Davidann finds significant evidence of what we might term ‘indigenous’ Chinese and Japanese 
concepts of what it means to be modern and of the ‘limitations’ of American efforts to define, if not impose, 
modernity upon China and Japan, not only in terms of governmental policies, but also in terms of how those 
societies and their histories were understood. One might add that in doing so, and much more, Davidann also 
stakes a claim for philosophies of the modern which can contain contradictions and inconsistencies, both 
across and within borders. All that was solid did not melt into air, but often seemed fractured and 
reconstituted. Whereas those matters can be seen in geo-political terms, they can also be understood in the 
context of intellectual networks, both social and phenomenological, as much as political. e limitations of 
Westernization is not only an assertion about political weakness, it is also one about the specificity of ideas 
rooted in particular societies, with the creators and disseminators of such ideas located within the social 
structure, as much if not more than in the polity, their positioning vis-à-vis the West part of their positioning 
within their own social orders.  
Whereas those issues have clear political and economic characteristics, they also have as part of Davidann’s 
text a particular view of the public intellectual. After all, the key Chinese, Japanese and American thinkers in 
his study were all to one degree or another what we now easily call ‘public intellectuals,’ a term born of the 
Dreyfus Affair in fin-de-siècle France.5 In other words, what jumps out at one is not only the competition of 
ideas among these thinkers, and their collaboration or cross-fertilization, but also their claims to be speaking 
for the public, or the nation. e “search for modernity” (6) makes a strong suggestion about the roles of such 
intellectuals in that search, a role reminiscent of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s early nineteenth-century 
nationalist “clerisy.”6 What was the role of the intellectual in Japan, China, the United States, or, more 
accurately, the roles of individuals and their institutional affiliations for those we could label “intellectuals?” 
Reflections upon those queries might help address the interest of one of the reviewers in the influence and 
dissemination of the ideas about modernity discussed by Davidann. How would we as historians define the 
roles and position of Fukuzawa Yukichi? Was his position in light of Japanese society at the time one that 
warrants the title, ‘intellectual?’ Most certainly Davidann’s pair of Ivy League East Asianist scholars warrants 
that title, among others. e duo of John K. Fairbank and Edwin O. Reischauer—with the addition of their 
disciples—comes immediately to mind, even to the mind of the non-specialist. 
                                                     
5 One could also explore the French past and find precedents in politiques, such as Montaigne, and philosophes, 
including Voltaire. 
6 Coleridge discussed the “clerisy” and its role in On the Constitution of the Church and State, published in 1830 
as part of the general debate about Catholic Emancipation in Great Britain. 
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It has been an honor and pleasure to not only read and reflect upon Davidann’s book, but to read the 
scholarly reviews posted below. ey are thoughtful, honest and while generally favorable, do raise points for 
Davidann and his readers.  
Connie Shemo notes the big tent of the intended audience, and thus the need to inform and keep engaged a 
range of readers who sit at various points along the spectrum of expertise and knowledge. e structure of “a 
series of analyses of specific historical figures, both East Asian and American,” and how they “wrestled” with 
modernity means that there will be too much background information for some readers. Shemo likens the 
author to “a person hosting a very diverse dinner party,” who must ensure that “his varied guests find 
common ground.” It is not easy to keep all guests satisfied. Some will leave before the entrée and some will 
overstay their welcome. But all will indulge in at least some food and drink. 
What about the intriguing point that key American thinkers visiting and studying ‘the East’ then returned 
home using their travels and observations to critique American society and modernity? Dewey and DuBois are 
among those. What do we make of that “reverse influence,” in Shemo’s term. Was it part of a larger 
“Occidentalist,” or “Orientalist” discourse and narrative. How significant to Dewey’s and DuBois’s 
contributions were those Eastern passages?7 We think of that American pair as essentially secularists, but what 
about the influence of American Protestant missionaries? How did their efforts help develop the American 
views on modernization in East Asia? 
Perhaps one of the limits to the American influence was the powerful influence of other creators or sources of 
modernization? Westernization was spoken in many different tongues, both then and now. Tomoko Akami 
asks about the influence of German thinking about modernity and the second-wave Liberalism of T. H. 
Green, a welfare-Liberalism influenced by English and Continental experiences. Westernization might have 
been limited by some of its own characteristics: inconsistencies and fundamental changes, and the competing 
political and cultural sources of the definers of modernity. Here, Akami would like to reconstruct the 
important connection between later nineteenth-century liberalism and modernity, or modernization, and, in 
doing so, reminds us that liberalism itself as a body of ideas and policies fundamentally changed by the turn of 
the twentieth century. ere was no hegemonic, unchanging Western modernity. One could make a claim 
that German thinkers have had a disproportionate influence on how we think about modernity as a 
philosophical and intellectual enterprise and problem, although they did not do so as their English, French 
and American colleagues did. 
Akami also probes a bit more deeply into the body of Westernization and modernization scholarship to 
remind us of its Cold War context, or, more specifically, its anti-Marxist and anti-Communist leanings. 
Where is the influential Marxist framework in Davidann’s study? Where are the scholarly works on “modern” 
Japan written from that self-conscious Radical Western point of view? Akami pushes Davidann to consider 
the larger “political background” of the twentieth-century creation of modernity—in both the United States 
and East Asia. Why was modernization developed within an internationalist framework of nation-states and 
not a more egalitarian global one? 
                                                     
7 Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit’s Occidentalism: e West in the Eyes of its Enemies (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2005) considers the use of ‘Eastern’ ideas and values to critique and attack the ‘West.’ 
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Cyrus Veeser asks about the relationships between ideas and materiality, and between the Asian past and its 
present. Is Davidann retroactively correcting Asian intellectual history “in order to reframe” the contemporary 
Asian material accomplishments? Is this intellectual tradition “more a question of reverse engineering than 
organic development?” Veeser suggests that Davidann is doing what his subjects did: inventing a tradition, 
“retrofitting ideas to things,” rather than showing how ideas “emerged from evolving facts on the ground.” Is 
it fair and truthful to work backwards from contemporary material prosperity to the less prosperous crucibles 
of intellectual modernity? In doing so, and in comparing different crucibles, do we find that key concepts and 
terms such as “civic virtue” share definitions across temporal space? Was there “a common framework and 
vocabulary,” which allowed for a legitimate dialogue in both directions?  
Davidann’s reluctance to address the common Marxist framework and vocabulary might be a corollary here, 
as Marx and those subsequently linking capitalism, technology, and modernity often did share a common 
language. ese questions matter not only for the doing of intellectual history, or the heated conference chats 
about Hegelian and Marxist base and superstructure, but it also matters when thinking about the world 
today. Is Davidann finding in East Asian modernity the sources of material wealth in China and Japan which 
are the envy of some in Latin America and Africa? By articulating that question, Veeser suggests the potential 
significance of this study in the continuing debate about ‘the wealth of nations,’ or why some nations are rich, 
and others not so. 
Sarah M. Griffith’s comments underscore the fluid, if not contingent, definition of modernism; at the very 
least, it is a contextual definition, one that requires for our appreciation “the nimbleness of East Asian 
intellectual thought” and acceptance that modernity was not and will never be “a static unchanging collection 
of ideas.” Her response recognizes those and other contributions at the core of Davidann’s book and she 
concludes with the eternal question for intellectual historians: how much did these ideas matter and to whom? 
In a world of East Asian and Western modernities, how can we evaluate the audiences and impacts of 
Davidann’s authors? Are the only distinctions those between American and East Asian modernities? Why not 
have generational modernities, or modernities tied to class, or social identity? Did any of this matter to “the 
folks on the ground?” Griffith reminds us that we do not know how the “average” East Asian “perceived” the 
flurry of philosophical debates and texts. One might very well ask that of the “average” American, as well. is 
vital point circles back in part to the roles that these thinkers played in their societies, and thus how much 
public authority they and their ideas enjoyed.  
Davidann did not set out to study popular or mass ideas, but Griffith asks a fair question if we are pursuing 
their traction and influence. Of course, modernity need not be democratic, or from the bottom up, but 
perhaps that trajectory was also part of the migration and dialogue alongside the more traditional geopolitical 
ones, a vertical conversation complementing the horizontal one. e “limits” of Westernization might very 
well include internal social and economic ones, as well as the external cultural and political ones considered by 
Davidann. By pushing his vision back into the nineteenth century, Davidann encourages Griffith to remind 
all of us that becoming modern answered not only the ‘National Question,’ but also the century’s ‘Social 
Question,’  neither of which were commonly answered in democratic and egalitarian ways. 
ese are serious historical and historiographical questions, asked of a serious scholarly attempt to join Don 
Quixote and others on the quest for the origins of modernity or modernities. Davidann’s quest has asked us 
to rethink fundamental assumptions about American power and influence, the equation of modernization and 
Westernization, and how powerful and influential ideas move along at least two-way intellectual 
superhighways. Not a bad day’s work! 
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Jon ares Davidann is Professor of History at Hawai’i Pacific University. He has published six books on 
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Peter H. Hoffenberg is Associate Professor of History at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa, where he 
teaches courses in the histories of Modern Britain, the British Empire, e World (since 1450), Modern 
Europe, and Economic ought. He is the author of An Empire on Display: English, Indian and Australian 
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of Australian Public Science, 1851-1888 (forthcoming in 2019). Among his interests are the social and 
economic aspects of modernity, since the later eighteenth century. 
Tomoko Akami is Associate Professor (Reader) at the ANU College of Asia and the Pacific. She is the author 
of Internationalizing the Pacific (2002), Japan's News Propaganda and Reuters' News Empire (2012), and Soft 
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Sarah Griffith (Ph.D. University of California, Santa Barbara) is the author of Asian American Civil Rights: 
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Queens University in Charlotte, NC, Griffith teaches courses on mid to late-nineteenth and twentieth-
century United States history with specializations in comparative race and ethnic studies, Asian American 
studies, and Pacific Rim transnationalisms. 
Connie Shemo is an associate professor of history at Plattsburgh State University, the author of e Chinese 
Medical Ministries of Kang Cheng and Shi Meiyu: On a Cross-Cultural Frontier of Gender, Race, and Nation 
(Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), and the co-editor of Competing Kingdoms: Women, Mission, Nation and the 
American Protestant Empire (Duke University Press, 2010). Her articles have appeared in Diplomatic History, 
Journal of American-East Asian Relations, and Journal of Women’s History, among others. She has also been a 
Fulbright Scholar at Shanghai University.  Her current project is a study of American missionary medical 
education for women in China as an important point of cultural contact 
Cyrus Veeser is professor of history at Bentley University in Waltham, Massachusetts.  He is author of A 
World Safe for Capitalism: Dollar Diplomacy and America's Rise to Global Power (Columbia University Press, 
2002) and Great Leaps Forward: Modernizers in Africa, Asia, and Latin America (Prentice Hall, 2009). 
 
H-Diplo Roundtable-XX-40 
8 | P a g e  
 
Review by Tomoko Akami, ANU College of Asia and the Pacific 
Tomoko.Akami@anu.edu.au  
hen one works on modern Japanese history in a global context in the English language medium, 
one constantly encounters descriptions, such as Japan’s ‘imitation’ or ‘mimicking’ and ‘Western 
tutelage.’ ese works often stress ‘Western influence’ with little attention to the roles of the 
Japanese actors, the historical contexts of Japan, or the rich Japanese-language scholarships in the given fields. 
A recently acclaimed work, e Internationalists,1 is one such example, despite the fact that it is significant in 
drawing the people’s attention to the Pact of Paris of 1928. 
I therefore fully endorse the main argument of Jon ares Davidann’s e Limits of Westernization: scholars 
had overstated “Western” influence in East Asia, and especially “[American] histories [of East Asia] gave the 
United States too much credit in shaping East Asian modernity” (1, 2-3, 225). Building on the same theme 
pursued by Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen,2 and their realization of the need to examine more “East Asia’s 
role in the creation of the modern world” (1), e Limits of Westernization “explores the boundaries of 
American influences on East Asia.” It especially examines “the origins and development of modern thoughts 
in the United States, Japan and China” in 1860–1960, and “gives greater voices to East Asians in the 
development of their own ideas of modernity” (2).  
In the following chapters, e Limits of Westernization surveys a significant number of American intellectuals’ 
direct and indirect encounters with Japan, China, and Korea, as well as, if to a lesser extent, the ideas and 
experiences of Japanese, Chinese, and Korean intellectuals in the United States. e coherence of these 
intellectuals as ‘modernists’ is not as clear as it is intended to be, partly because it is hard to dissociate 
‘modernists’ from the ‘modernism’ of the specific art/architecture/literature movements, and partly because 
the book’s definition of the term may make it harder not to cover most intellectuals of the period, including 
communists, socialists, reactionaries, fascists, or total war advocates.  
e Limits of Westernization nonetheless succeeds in introducing key ideas of these prominent intellectuals 
across the Pacific, without resorting to academic jargon, and it will be a good read for not only scholars and 
university students, but also for general readers. It is also useful for those who specialize in American histories 
or East Asian histories so that they can come to understand less familiar fields. Furthermore, it draws out the 
diverse meanings of the American-East Asian encounters of certain prominent intellectuals, which may 
otherwise escape notice. One such case discussed in e Limits of Westernization is the journey of W. E. B. Du 
Bois to the Japanese empire in 1936. e case demonstrates that his anti-white dominance stance made him 
more prone to imperial Japan’s propaganda of anti-Euro-American rhetoric to an extent that he became 
almost blind to Japan’s own imperial brutality in China and their exploitation of China (175–8). 
                                                     
1 Oona A. Hathaway and Scott J. Shapiro, e Internationalists: How a Radical Plan to Outlaw War Remade the 
World, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017. Similar descriptions are evident in broader histories, such as Niall 
Ferguson’s Civilization: e West and the Rest (London: Allen Lane, 2011).  
2 Martin W. Lewis and Kären E. Wigen, e Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1997). 
W 
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As the scope of e Limits of Westernization is geographically and intellectually vast, in the limited space 
below, I will focus on two discussion points, which I see as important for the main theme of e Limits of 
Westernization, and on which I have some background:  North American historiography of modern Japanese 
history, modernization theory, and Marxism; and liberalism and German influence on it. 
North American historiography of modern Japanese history, the modernization theory, and Marxism 
e Limits of Westernization argues that the post-war (post 1945) modernization-theory-framed histories of 
East Asia by American scholars were largely responsible for a popular view which overstated ‘Western’ (which 
equates with American) influence in East Asian histories. is is a valid and significant point. It reminds me 
of a rather ‘odd’ feeling I had, when I started to teach modern Japanese history in an Australian university 
almost two decades ago. I studied Japanese History in Japan, and for my Ph.D. thesis, I read primary and 
secondary sources on interwar and wartime Japan, and the large bulk of scholarly works was in Japanese. is 
meant that for teaching modern Japanese history in a university in Australia, I had to survey much more 
broadly scholarly works in English in this field, and here I encountered the modernization-theory-framed 
‘orthodox’ modern Japanese history. 
ere were a few reasons why I felt ‘odd’ with this orthodoxy. First, it was vastly different from the ‘orthodox’ 
scholarship of modern Japanese history I learned in Japan, which had been dominated by a Marxist 
framework at least until the late 1970s. Second, its notion of the ‘West’ as an agency of liberal democracy for 
Japan was largely silent on an aspect of empire and international power structure. ird, associated with this 
problematic notion of the ‘West’ were embedded Orientalist stereotypes of ‘Japanese culture’ and ‘Japanese 
society.’ I still have a vivid memory of a comment made by a student watching a video on Japanese students’ 
Anpo demonstration (against the conclusion of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the 
United States and Japan) that I showed at a class. e student refuted the footage claiming that unlike the 
‘Westerners,’ the Japanese were collectivist and obedient, and would not do such a demonstration. I became 
very reluctant to use the terms of the ‘West’ and ‘Westernization’ in teaching and researching modern 
Japanese history.  
In order to understand this ‘orthodoxy,’ it was crucial to learn its political background. I am grateful to Judith 
Snodgrass who alerted me to read John Dower’s piece in his edited Emergence of Modern Japan.3 I then read 
Sheldon Garon’s insightful piece on the modernization theory in Japanese history.4  
is brings me to the first discussion point for e Limits of Westernization. How should Marxism be located 
in our understanding of the limits of American intellectual influence in Japan in the period under 
examination? As e Limits of Westernization also makes it clear, the modernization theory of Walt W. 
Rostow, American economist who was influential in US policy to Southeast Asia in the 1960s, was a counter-
Communist Manifesto, and the ‘orthodoxy’ of modern Japanese history in English was a counter-Marxist 
interpretation. In the 1970s, Dower had to re-discover and re-evaluate Egerton Herbert (E. H.) Norman’s 
                                                     
3 John Dower, “E.H. Norman, Japan and the Use of history,” in John Dower, ed., Origin of the Modern 
Japanese State: Selected Writings of E.H. Norman (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975). 
4 Sheldon Garon, “Rethinking Modernization and Modernity in Japanese history: A Focus on State-Society 
Relations,” e Journal of Asian Studies 53:2 (1994): 346-366. 
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works, which were marginalized by this dominant orthodox scholarship. More importantly, this was also an 
exercise of bringing the pre-war works of Japanese Marxist historians, which Norman’s works engaged with 
and drew from, into the English-language historiography of modern Japan. Norman was of course not an 
American, but a Canadian, which may fall outside the scope of e Limits of Westernization. Yet, Norman’s 
engagement with Japanese intellectuals before the war, his connections with pioneering scholars of Asian 
Studies in the U.S. through his associations with Harvard and the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), his 
involvement in the U.S.-led occupation in postwar Japan, and his post-war engagements with Japanese 
intellectual giants, such as Maruyama Masao and other “progressive” (many Marxist) scholars, all seem to 
justify the inclusion of Norman and his works in the book. Furthermore, this is a significant and unique case 
of the reverse impact of Japanese Marxist intellectuals on English-language scholarship. Locating Norman and 
his works in the framework of e Limits of Westernization may have been intellectually fruitful in further 
deepening the understanding of American-East Asian intellectual engagements, and the notion of modernity 
in East Asia.  
Liberalism, kakushin (statist-reformism), liberal internationalism, and German influence in inter-war Japan and 
beyond 
e second discussion point is the nature of liberalism and the significance of German intellectual influence in 
inter-war Japan for understanding the main theme of e Limits of Westernization, the limits of American 
intellectual influence. In my earlier work on the IPR, I drew attention to the need to distinguish “New 
Liberalism” from laissez faire liberalism, and stressed the influence of German idealism and the works of 
omas H. Green, which were inspired by German idealism, in his “New Liberalism”. e distinction of this 
strand of “New Liberalism,” which could also be understood as “welfare liberalism,” was important for 
grasping the nature of inter-war liberalism in international politics for two main reasons. First, “liberalism” 
was often associated with economic laissez faire liberalism and the “freer” trade principle in an international 
arena. Second, there was a significant shift in the younger generation of “liberals” and so-called “liberal” (or 
non-communist/socialist) internationalists at the Japanese Council of the IPR (JCIPR) to this welfare 
liberalism. It was a global, and interactive intellectual paradigm shift, one which was paralleled among IPR 
members and their associates in other countries.5  
In my view, rather than modernity, as e Limits of Modernization suggests, this strand of welfare liberalism 
holds the key to understanding the connections between nationalism, internationalism, and imperialism, 
which have puzzled many. To start with, most interwar ‘liberal’ internationalists were not anarchists or 
cosmopolitans. Rather, their internationalism was firmly based on the national units, and this was also the 
case for IPR members across the countries. As for Nitobe Inazō, one of the most prominent ‘liberal’ 
internationalists in inter-war Japan, nationalism and internationalism, therefore, coexisted, or more precisely, 
the former was constitutive for the latter for most IPR members not only in Japan, but also in other countries. 
It became a problem for Japanese IPR members only when their own state challenged the international status 
quo in 1931. Furthermore, while the defeated Axis empires lost their colonies in 1919, and a new norm of 
self-determination was applied to new nation-states in Europe in the aftermath of these empires, the 
victorious empires, including the U.S. and Japan, maintained their own colonies. As Akira Iriye argued, there 
                                                     
5 Tomoko Akami, Internationalizing the Pacific: e United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in 
War and Peace, 1919-1945 (New York: Routledge, 2002). 
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was a search for a new order after 1919 in Asia, which was still dominated by empires and their colonies.6 Not 
only nationalism, but also existing empires (and their colonies), therefore, remained constitutive factors 
within “liberal internationalism” throughout the inter-war period. 
In this context, on the domestic front a new strand of liberalism, welfare liberalism, was increasingly seeing 
the ‘modern’ state as the provider of the welfare of the society as a whole, including newly enfranchised male 
working-class voters. is was a significantly different role of the state understood in classic liberalism (or 
laissez faire liberalism) as an oppressor of the political and civil rights of its people. e more the intellectuals 
and activists became aware of the need for greater welfare measures, therefore, the more they felt the need for 
a stronger and bigger state. is thinking was evident already in Yoshino Sakuzō, the proponent of Taisho 
democracy, who was influential among younger JCIPR members, and was more manifest in these younger 
JCIPR members, such as Tsurumi Yūsuke, but more in Ro ̄yama Masamichi, Matsumoto Shigeharu, and 
Matsukata Saburō. is shiftexplains why some of these younger JCIPR members became close to Konoe 
Fumimaro, Prime Minister in the crucial period of 1937–1939 and 1940–1941, involved themselves in his 
think tank, Sho ̄wa kenkyūkai (1933-1940), and could align with kakushin (statist-reformist) bureaucrats in 
the 1930s and during the war. Furthermore, for some, it was not a major intellectual leap to expand a sphere 
of ‘social’ measures of the Japanese state beyond Japan proper to its colonies and then its military-occupied 
areas, or use such welfare rhetoric to justify Japan’s military expansion. One can see a similar leap in the social 
imperialism of some Fabians, or Carl Schmitt, German jurist and political theorist, whose works contributed 
to theorizing the policies of Nazi Germany. 
is strand of “welfare liberalism,” which was dominant in inter-war Japan,7 therefore, is crucial to 
understand the nature of ‘liberals’ and ‘liberal internationalists’ in inter-war Japan, which inevitably challenges 
the neat dichotomy of liberals versus nationalists, or liberals versus imperialists. To be sure, diverse sources 
shaped inter-war welfare liberalism, including the British guild socialism which inspired Rōyama.8 Yet, 
German intellectual influence was strong among statist-oriented reformists in Japan in the 1930s and 1940s, 
many of whom were educated at male elite institutions with a strong German learning tradition. Last, it is 
worth noting that such German influence was not confined to Japan, as a recent work stresses this influence 
on “American” classical “realists,” such as Hans Morgenthau.9 Indeed, demarcating lines of what were 
                                                     
6 Akira Iriye, After Imperialism: e Search for a New Order in the Far East, 1921-1931 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1965). 
7 Tomoko Akami, “Nation, State, Empire and War: Problems of Liberalism in Modern Japanese History and 
Beyond,” Japanese Studies 25:2 (2005): 119-140. 
8 e legacy of this inter-war “welfare liberalism” in post-war Japan also could be seen in Rōyama’s involvement 
in the establishment of Minshatō (Democratic Socialist Party) in 1960, stemming from the right wing faction of the 
Japan Socialist Party. On this post-war legacy, the works by Sakai Tetsuya are most illuminating. See, for example, Sakai 
Tetsuya, “Shakai minshu shugi ha kokkyō o koeruka: Kokusai kankeiron ni okeru shakai minshu shugi saikō” [Could 
Social Democracy Cross National Borders?: Re-consideration of Social Democracy in IR eories], Shiso ̄ 1020 (2009): 
133-151. 
9 Nicholas Guilhot, After the Enlightenment: Political Realism and International Relations in the Mid-Twentieth 
Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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Japanese, American, or German thoughts and influences is a complex task in the context of globalized 
modernity  
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Review by Sarah M. Griffith, Queens University of Charlotte 
n his newest book, Jon ares Davidann explores the origins and development of modern thought in the 
United States, Japan, and China from the late nineteenth through early twentieth centuries (2). ere has 
been a tendency among scholars to see modernity as something created in the West and bestowed upon 
non-western nations and cultures. As the book’s title suggests, Davidann doesn’t deny that American 
intellectual thought impacted East Asian intellectuals. Instead, he tests the boundaries of that influence by 
exploring the voices of well-known intellectuals from both sides of the Pacific and puts them in conversation 
with one another. In doing so, he outlines a more nuanced telling of the origins and evolution of modern 
thought in the region.  
e first many chapters explore the rich transpacific dialogues that emerged among and between American 
and East Asian intellectuals during the turn of the twentieth century. Davidann shows that the transmission 
of modernist thought was not limited to Atlantic circles but flowed as well from the United States to East Asia 
and in the opposite direction from East Asia to the United States (55). American intellectuals responded to 
capitalist industrialization, immigration, and racism by emphasizing liberation, scientific rationality, progress, 
civic duty, and democracy. East Asian intellectuals believed a virtuous citizenry, self-sacrifice, and the greater 
good were necessary components to establishing modern nations (4). Only by creating national strength and 
cohesion could East Asian nations combat imperialism. Although working toward different ends, these 
concepts were significant and gave modernists on both sides of the Pacific a shared sense of purpose (4). 
Davidann shows how the migrations of people and ideas back and forth across the Pacific encouraged the 
blending of intellectual traditions. Eastern mysticism shaped William James’ lectures and writings on 
pluralism; W.E.B. Du Bois looked to Japan’s defeat of a major Western power in the 1904-5 Russo-Japanese 
War as a model for challenging white supremacy. Although he rejected nationalism and debated whether 
China was prepared for modernity, John Dewey was impressed by the groundswell of revolutionary activity 
unleashed during China’s May Fourth Movement. After travelling to the United States, Japanese scholar 
Fukuzawa Yukichi advocated certain aspects of westernization including national sovereignty, the 
development of national wealth, military strength, and civic virtue. Inspired by Japan’s ability to overturn its 
feudal past, Chinese reformer Liang Qichao advocated civic virtue and citizens’ duty to community and state 
as crucial to the development of a strong nation. Two decades later, Sun Yat-sen witnessed the dynamism of 
western culture and Japan’s modernization and yearned for the same sort of transformation in China.  
As likely as they were to embrace Western modernist thought, East Asian intellectuals frequently diverged 
from, and in some cases rejected outright, Westernization. is was especially the case as modernism collided 
with emerging nationalist movements in Japan, China, and Korea. When Fukuzawa Yukichi and Sun Yat-sen 
spoke of building civic virtue, they rooted their thinking not in western philosophies but, rather, in the 
fifteenth-century writings of Chinese Confucian scholar Wang Yangming who encouraged citizens to possess 
strong moral courage and dedicate themselves to the protection of the nation against internal and external 
threats (21-22). As Western powers expanded their political and economic influence across East Asia Wang 
provided the inspiration Chinese and Japanese intellectuals needed to encourage unselfish civic virtue capable 
of warding off foreign imperialists. Although Korean intellectuals receive less comprehensive treatment in the 
book, Davidann indicates similar efforts to draw on tradition as a means to defend the nation against 
colonialism in that country. After Japan and China went to war over the Korean peninsula in 1898, Korean 
intellectual Yun Chi Ho pushed for educational reform and representative government while also encouraging 
I 
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the promotion of indigenous language and Confucian traditions that emphasized ethical rules for public 
safety and order (47).  
As the Darwinistic struggle for survival and dominance in the Pacific continued unabated across the early 
1900s, East Asian intellectuals increasingly rejected the notion that the United States, and American 
progressive reformers in particular, had the answers needed to build strong and sovereign nations. American 
YWCA administrators praised Japanese secretary Michi Kawai for her success in building the organization, 
but when she called for indigenization, the same administrators chastised her for being “anti-foreign.” (141) 
During his two year travels in East Asia, Chinese intellectuals flocked to the lectures of John Dewey. 
However, the most influential author at the time, Lu Xun, rejected Dewey’s pragmatism along with 
humanism and western cosmopolitanism, calling instead for the renewal of revolutionary vigor in the Chinese 
people. Chinese reformers rejected the internationalism espoused by American progressive reformers like Jane 
Addams as inadequate for meeting the challenges the nation faced in the aftermath of war. Japanese 
intellectuals lamented municipal reforms proposed by historian Charles Beard as little more than imperialism 
bottled in new vessels. Over the post-World War I era, American intellectuals were increasingly marginalized 
in East Asian intellectual circles as being out of touch or simply negligent of the challenges, and potential 
opportunities, East Asia nations faced.   
e Great Depression only tarnished further the United States’ image, and the influence of American 
modernists, in East Asia. e 1929 stock market crash and global depression that followed revealed the 
weaknesses of industrial capitalism. Over the course of the 1930s, East Asian intellectuals, and Japanese in 
particular, responded to the crisis by departing further from their American counterparts. Japanese scholar 
Royama Masamichi rejected western liberal internationalism, embracing instead Japanese regionalism, the 
economic exploitation of neighboring countries, and empire building through military force (183). Younger 
intellectuals like Takeuchi Yoshimi followed Masamachi’s lead in advocating for imperialism with even fewer 
constraints. In their telling, it was only right that Japan stood at the center of an Asian-centered modernity 
given its status as the pre-eminent social, economic, and military force in the region (186).  
Following the United States’ victory in the Pacific War, American intellectuals again returned to American-
centric notions of modernity. Leading intellectuals John King Fairbank, Talcott Parsons, and Edwin O. 
Reischauer embraced modernization theory and the belief that East Asian nations would only survive in the 
post-war world order with the guiding hand of the United States. According to Fairbank, China’s ancient and 
traditional roots remained static, unchanged, and destined to contribute to authoritarianism. In Reischauer’s 
telling, Japan’s militarism during the 1930s and 1940s represented little more than “a dark valley” (14, 219), 
a momentary digression away from what had been a steady path to Westernization and modernization in the 
pre and post-WWII period. In his thinking, the American Occupation of Japan served to right the ship once 
again.  
Japanese scholars like Maruyama Masao likewise looked to Europe and the United States for models on which 
to base modern progress in the post-World War II era. Yet, as had been the case before the war, Masao did 
not simply write off East Asians as active agents in the process. Rather, he returned to the writings of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi to make sense of the militarism that drove Japanese politics and society during the Second 
World War. As before the war, East Asian intellectuals could acknowledge the significance the West played in 
shaping the modern world, but refused to disavow completely the central role East Asian intellectuals had 
played in shaping modernity in their home countries.  
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e research here is refreshing for a number of reasons. Too often modernism is seen as something hatched in 
the Western world and bestowed upon non-western nations.  is simply was not the case. Japanese and 
Chinese intellectuals blended western and eastern traditions into new amalgams that worked for the 
conditions in which they found themselves and their nations. As those conditions changed, so too did their 
thinking about what modernism was and how it might be applied to the political, social, and economic 
worlds in which they lived. In exploring these shifts and divergences in intellectual thought Davidann also 
challenges the notion that modernity was a static, unchanging collection of ideas.  
Davidann’s willingness to engage with and understand East Asian intellectuals on their own terms is also 
refreshing. When we take the time to analyze the writing of these authors in the time and space in which they 
were created, formerly contradictory trends make more sense. American, Japanese, and Chinese intellectuals 
all favored the building of civic culture but East Asians as often found their inspirations in centuries old, 
indigenous traditions as they did in recent Western philosophies. e research reveals the nimbleness of East 
Asian intellectual thought as well. While American intellectuals like Charles Beard lamented the decline of 
western civilization in the aftermath of World War I, East Asian intellectuals saw new inroads to power. 
Japanese author Royama Masamichi envisioned a cooperative East Asian community in the 1930s led by the 
Japanese government and military. Chiang Kai-shek’s New Life Movement blended Confucian and Christian 
ideologies and positioned Han Chinese at the center of a new national order in China. is continuous 
adaptation, blending, and indigenization persisted in the post-World War II era, even if American 
intellectuals failed to recognize as much.   
As for questions, I was left wondering how otherwise ‘average’ East Asians perceived all this activity. Davidann 
emphasizes that his focus rests squarely on the published works of “well-known” American and East Asian 
authors (6). But what about the folks on the ground? By World War I Japanese people were among the most 
educated in the world. How did students, progressive reformers, union workers, and others respond to 
modernity? e 1911 Republican Revolution and the First World War birthed a new generation of youth 
activists in China. What did these young people make of the diverse and divergent intellectual trends forming 
around them? Did they embrace, reject, and/or blend these lines of thought into their own evolving sense of 
modernity? Given the increasingly important role American, Japanese, and Chinese women played in the 
progressive movement of the nineteen teens and twenties I would have liked to hear more of their voices in 
this story as well. We learn a great deal about Jane Addams, and early social scientists like Ruth Benedict, and 
Margaret Mead. We are also introduced to progressives like Michi Kawai and Communist Party member 
Ding Ling. But weren’t there other women writing and thinking about modernity?   
Overall, Davidann succeeds in disrupting the notion that the West was the pre-eminent fount of modernist 
thinking in the years leading up to World War II. Here, American intellectuals come across at best as self-
absorbed, and at worst as oblivious outsiders, to the revolutionary movements re-shaping East Asia. is 
persisted into the post-Second World War era when the older generation of ‘China’ and ‘Japan hands’ 
returned to and embraced American-centric modernization theory. In fact, the success of various Communist 
movements in East Asia proved that the United States had failed to convince millions of Chinese, 
Vietnamese, and Korean citizens that America had the answers they needed to overturn the past, challenge 
imperialist control, or create and engage in global economies. Despite the primacy of modernization theory in 
the early Cold War, it would seem that the radical historians in the 1970s and post-modernists in the 1990s 
were on to something when they critiqued the United States for being out of touch, its leaders blinded by 
their own telling of the past and future. As U.S.-East Asia relations continue to fluctuate under the current 
administration, politicians and diplomats would be wise to open their ears to the voices on the ground and 
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acknowledge, as they failed to do in the past, that the United States offers but one model upon which to build 
stability and power in the Pacific. 
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Review by Connie Shemo, SUNY Plattsburgh 
n the introduction to e Limits of Westernization, Jon Davidann points out a key similarity between 
American scholarship on East Asia from the 1940s to 1960, which tended to portray the United States as 
providing a relatively benevolent “guiding hand” to a “positive modernization,” (exemplified by John 
King Fairbank and Edward Reischauer), and scholarship in the 1960s which “castigated” Western 
involvement in East Asia as destructive imperialism (5). In spite of the differences between these two scholarly 
trends, both took for granted “the immense influence of the United States.” Davidann proposes a “third turn 
in the writing of American-East Asian relations,” one which challenges the centrality of American influence in 
East Asian modernity (5-6). In essence, Davidann is challenging the “conflation of westernization with 
modernity” (16) which has dominated scholarship produced both in the West and in Asia.   
As have many scholars, Davidann discusses the influence of the particular historical moment in which the 
above mentioned scholarly trends were produced. In the introduction, and then in more detail, in Chapter 6, 
he argues that the power of the United States immediately following the Second World War caused both 
Fairbank and Reischauer to emphasize the influence of the United States in Chinese and Japanese pursuits of 
“modernity” (10-15, Chapter 6). In particular, he shows how Reischauer’s scholarship on Japan grew to 
emphasize the role of the United States in the Meiji era more and more as the United States’ occupation of 
Japan progressed in the period after World War II (221-225). e enormous influence of these scholars led to 
an emphasis on Western power in China and Japan even among scholars who argue with many of their 
points.  
What I found even more interesting were Davidann’s reflections on how the current historical moment 
influenced his own scholarship. He opens the book with a vignette about wandering through the Beijing 
airport, noting its “immense size, efficiency and luxury,” and then comments on the “high efficiency 
transportation networks (much more efficient than the United States)” in East Asian countries (1). Having 
lived in Shanghai from September 2017 to January 2018, I can add to this list the advances in China in 
moving to a cashless economy, with the ability to use a phone for all payments more developed than is 
currently the case in the United States, even when buying from street vendors. Of course, even in Shanghai 
and Beijing, one does not have to go far from the gleaming centers of the cities to find areas that do not 
exemplify ‘modernity’ as it is described in this opening, and in China there is a strong urban/rural divide. 
Nonetheless, Davidann’s question of “how on earth Westerners could claim East Asian modernity as their 
invention” (1) must occur to many Americans who visit East Asian countries. Later in the book, he quotes 
Charles Beard’s statement in his 1933 Presidential address to the American Historical Association that “each 
historian who writes history is a product of his age,” pointing out that this statement has “become an object of 
both praise and ridicule” (157). Regardless of where one stands on this particular statement, it is clear that 
even when historical data remains the same, historians of different periods will come to this data with 
questions shaped by the world in which they live.  
e book is structured as a series of analyses of specific historical figures, both East Asian and American, who 
wrestled with issues of ‘modernity.’ Rather than discuss Americans first, and then East Asian interpretation of 
American ideology, Davidann begins with a chapter on East Asian figures who addressed issues of modernity: 
the Japanese modernizer Fukuzawa Yukichi, a kind of founding father of modern Japan, the Chinese reformer 
Liang Qichao and Chinese revolutionary Sun Yat-sen, and the Korean modernist Yun Chi Ho. For all of 
these figures, Davidann rejects the label of ‘Westernizers’ sometimes given by other scholars (particularly in 
the case of Fukuzawa), emphasizing instead a synthesis of Confucian scholarship, particularly the thought of 
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Wang Yang-ming, with ideas coming from the West, as they attempted to build strong nations able to resist 
Western imperialism (and in the case of Japan, become imperialist themselves). One especially interesting 
observation is that Fukuzawa explored concepts of ‘cultural relativism’ (without using that label) almost a half 
century before the anthropologist Franz Boas. is insight influences the next chapter, which opens with a 
discussion of Boas. While Davidann emphasizes the importance of Boas to the development of ideas of 
cultural relativism and critiques of theories of racial hierarchy in the West, he has already established that 
intellectuals in East Asia had been exploring some of these same ideas, thus, as he suggests, complicating the 
notion that “Americans were the driving force in East Asian modernity” (53).  
Davidann takes great care in bringing to life all the people he treats. In all honesty I was at first a bit 
nonplussed by the vivid and almost invariably complimentary physical descriptions of each historical actor. As 
I read on, however, I came to see the descriptions as part of a broader project. Davidann is writing for a 
variety of scholars—Asianists, Americanists, and scholars interested in questions of ‘westernization’ and 
‘modernization’ more broadly. In some ways he is like a person hosting a very diverse dinner party, trying to 
help his varied guests find common ground. Any scholar of not only Japanese, but of Chinese or Korean 
history, for example, would be very familiar with Fukuzawa Yukichi, as would any Japanese citizen (as 
Davidann points out, Fukuzawa’s portrait is on Japanese banknotes, 48). Many Americanists, however, need 
more of an introduction. Conversely, while figures such as Jane Addams and W.E.B. Du Bois loom large in 
American history, some Asianists might need more background. Because the stories of the different figures are 
intertwined in this book, it is important that each figure be clear in the minds of his readers.   
In this same vein, Davidann makes sure to clarify the different meanings that terms can have in particular 
cultural contexts. In discussing Charles Beard’s visit to Japan to study urban planning, for example, he 
explains that in the 1920s ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ meant different things in a Japanese than an American 
setting. Even a “conservative nationalist” in Japan could support “progressive reform” in the cities, seen as a 
“liberal” cause in the United States, while “liberal” politicians often supported Japanese empire (116-117). 
Davidann’s ability to act as kind of a tour guide for scholars venturing into new fields is a valuable component 
of this book.  
roughout the book, Davidann argues both that Westerners who are thought to have been influential in Asia 
(most notably the well-known educator John Dewey in China, also historian Charles Beard in Japanese urban 
planning) were not nearly as important as has been suggested by other scholars, and that East Asian figures 
who are popularly viewed as Westernizers, not only Fukuzawa and Liang Qichao, but also, for example, Hu 
Shih, a major figure in the May Fourth movement and Dewey’s interpreter, were in fact synthesizers of East 
Asian thought. He presents compelling evidence for both arguments. In Dewey’s and Beard’s cases, he can 
cite their own words which minimized their influence. In the case of East Asian intellectuals, he points to the 
variety of influences found in their writing. By the end of the book Davidann has built a convincing case for 
the “limits of Westernization” in East Asian modernity.  
ere is another argument running throughout the book which I found equally interesting, although it is 
more difficult to prove. Davidann argues that “ideas flowed in both directions, from the United States to East 
Asia but also in the opposite direction, from the United States to East Asia” (55). Exploring East Asian 
influence on American historical figures in particular leads to a fascinating and poignant analysis of Du Bois, 
who is undoubtedly an important figure in American historical scholarship. His visit to Japan and support for 
the Japanese empire, however, have not received nearly as much scholarly attention as other aspects of his 
thought, such as his writings on African-Americans in the United States and his pan-Africanism. Davidann 
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ties Du Bois’s interest in Japan to these better known aspects of his career, providing a clear understanding of 
why Du Bois would support the Japanese Empire to the point of turning a blind eye to its growing human 
rights abuses. Yet in other cases, there are only tantalizing hints of influence, such as a brief mention that John 
Dewey later drew on Confucianism “in an attempt to construct an ideal community” (55). As the main point 
of the book is to prove the “limits of Westernization” rather than to argue for this reverse influence, it is not 
surprising that there was not more discussion of these points. It is, however, an interesting question for future 
scholarship. A particularly interesting question to explore would be how this reverse influence differed from 
the ‘Orientalism’ that Davidann references throughout the book.  
Finally, Limits of Westernization makes valuable companion reading to another recent book, David Hollinger’s 
Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tried to Change the World but Changed America.1 Like Davidann, 
Hollinger extensively treats both Fairbank and Reischauer, although his purpose is to explore the influence of 
missionaries on the creation of Chinese and Japanese Studies (this is more straightforward with Reischauer, 
the son of missionaries.) Hollinger argues that after the First World War, American “mainline” Protestant 
missionaries became an important force in promoting “multiculturalism” and anti-racist ideas in the United 
States, suggesting that they were changed by the people they were trying to convert (1-2). Davidann provides 
a better understanding of complex syntheses of ideas in East Asia that missionaries would have encountered, 
providing insight into why so many Protestant missionaries became committed to an anti-racist world view 
while on the mission field.  
 
                                                     
1 David Hollinger, Protestants Abroad: How Missionaries Tried to Change the World but Changed America 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017).   
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Review by Cyrus Veeser, Bentley University 
on ares Davidann has given us a welcome, extraordinarily well researched, multinational intellectual 
history of Asian modernity that will be of interest to historians in a number of fields.  To this specialist in 
U.S. policy toward Latin America, Davidann’s painstaking illumination of the Asian intellectuals who 
theorized modernity, and in particular the lines of filiation and descent among them, is impressive indeed. His 
goal, stated clearly, is to “unwind Westernization”—the tendency of Europeans and Americans to attribute 
everything modern in Asia to the influence of the West. rough World War II westerners saw Asian 
modernity as “fake,” a thin, imported crust pasted over a pre-modern core. Davidann’s ambitious study 
challenges us to accept two distinct demystifications of this Eurocentrism: first, that “western and American 
ideas of modernity played a less substantial role than we have assumed” in the achievement of Asian 
modernity, and that “East Asian concepts . . . played a more important role in shaping modernity in East 
Asia” (x).  
One striking example of how the Western gaze regularly reassured itself that even the most advanced Eastern 
societies could not achieve modernity on their own is provided by revered missionary Sydney Gulick, who in 
1905 ticked off the negative traits of Oriental civilization: it was autocratic, hierarchical, hostile to women’s 
rights and representative government, and devoted to militarism (8). Gulick essentialized these characteristics 
as the bone structure of Asian feudalism, yet two decades later those identical traits would appear in Mein 
Kampf, the bible of a new departure in European modernity.   
Because my own research areas are distant from Davidann’s, my contributions to this roundtable are very 
much those of an interested outsider. is is a groundbreaking work, and many of the points I raise are 
attempts to clarify the challenging arguments Davidann sets forth. My questions are likely to have more to do 
with my own tentative grasp of the internal dynamic of Asian modernity than any faults in the study itself. 
is is a heartfelt, not a pro forma, disclaimer, as I will now demonstrate.  
Perhaps in the spirit of the pragmatists that make up the core group of Americans he examines, Davidann 
makes do with working definitions rather than engaging in heavily footnoted interrogations of such terms as 
orientalist, modernist, pragmatism, progressivism, and modernity itself. Presumably he assumed that the book’s 
myriad concrete examples give meaning to those terms and obviate the need to toil over definitional 
perfection.  e strategy leaves room for genuine confusion, however. In the Western context, there is not 
much overlap between modernists and modernizers, and the American modernists who are most prominent 
here are critics of American culture and capitalism, not disciples of modernization. Yet that distinction is at 
times elided in the narrative, with pacifist reformer Jane Addams and Vietnam War hawk Walter Rostow 
seeming to inhabit the same category. e modernist versus modernizer question can also be posed about the 
Asian intellectuals featured here, from the influential Meiji Era intellectual Fukuzawa Yukichi to People’s 
Republic founder Mao Zedong.  
Given the double-edged project that Davidann sets out for himself, it comes as something of a surprise when 
he declares that “for all its diversity, modern thought retained a laudable, common framework . . . Modernists 
developed quite similar ideas in both the East and the West [:] the goals of liberation, progress, scientific 
rationality, relativism, individualism, civic duty and democracy drove modernists forward” (4). Davidann 
quickly clarifies that while these common concepts “gave modernists a shared sense of purpose,” there were 
“essential distinctions” between American and East Asian intellectuals. Two of the themes that Limits of 
Westernization explores in detail are the priority given by Asian intellectuals to the notion of “civic virtue,” 
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which Davidann traces back to the Neo-Confucian Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529); another is the critical 
correlation between individualism and national independence proposed by Fukuzawa Yukichi (1868-1912). 
Civic virtue and individualism certainly resonated with American pragmatists, yet did modernists a world 
apart really share a common framework and vocabulary as they worked out their critiques of the very different 
states and polities they inhabited?   
e Limits of Westernization is unabashedly intellectual history, yet it is noteworthy that the author’s 
inspiration for the study came from an encounter with things, not ideas. Stuck for several hours at Beijing’s 
Capital International airport, Davidann drank in the awesome efficiency and luxury around him, “a 
tremendous display of the distinctive power and dynamism of East Asian modernity.” e stunning, recent 
material progress he witnessed led him to question “how on earth westerners could claim East Asian 
modernity as their invention, when it is undoubtedly the creation of East Asians themselves” (1). us 
Davidann’s study of ideas began not, for example, with an echo of Wang Yang-ming’s thought in President Xi 
Jinping’s report to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, but in the awesome physical 
modernity of contemporary China.  
Given that point of origin, the search for the Asian origins of Asian modernity becomes something like a 
retroactive correction of Asian intellectual history in order to reframe the material accomplishments of the 
Asian present. To a significant degree, Davidann’s project recapitulates the process that he describes unfolding 
among Asian intellectuals themselves. “In the pre-war period,” he notes, “East Asians plunged into their own 
history to find indigenous sources for modernity” (16). One Asian intellectual who plunged deeply into the 
past was Hu Shih (1891-1962), whose 1917 Ph.D. dissertation at Columbia, titled “Development of Logical 
Method in Ancient China,” asked “‘How can we best assimilate modern civilization in such a manner as to 
make it congenial and congruous and continuous with the civilization of our own making’?” (93-94). 
Davidann notes approvingly that “Hu understood as a young man that China needed to have a basis for 
modernity in its own traditions.”  
at undertaking, for Davidann as much as for Hu Shih, involved retooling Confucian doctrines to provide a 
basis for the shared goals of modernists: “liberation, progress, scientific rationality, relativism, individualism, 
civic duty and democracy.” Interestingly, Davidann suggests that at times the Asian intellectuals were not 
even aware of the indigenous origins of their own thought. us at the important conference on 
“Overcoming Modernity,” held in Tokyo in 1942, Japanese intellectuals “overstated their Europeanization” 
since “unwittingly, they were more hybrid modernists” (191). Similarly, Davidann notes that “whether Hu 
Shi realized or not, Wang Yang-ming, in his emphasis on the connection between knowledge and action, was, 
in fact, an early pragmatist” (95). 
e relationship between ideas and things, modernity and modernization, is not one that Davidann ignores. 
Violent encounters with the West after 1800 were for East Asians a demystifying collision with both ideas and 
hard realities. In China and Japan, that encounter with Western power convinced intellectuals of the self-
interest and racism that underlay Euro-American pretensions of universality. As a consequence East Asians 
“deconstructed the universalism of modernity” (244). Yet China and Japan had different starting points in 
their movement toward modernity that had everything to do with their material conditions. “Chinese 
intellectuals attempting to engage in reform could not connect with nationalism like Japanese intellectuals 
because the Chinese nation didn’t exist,” Davidann states, a puzzling assertion in the aftermath of the Boxer 
Rebellion and the 1905 boycott of American products to protest the Chinese Exclusion Act (44-45). 
Davidann mentions the Boxer Rebellion briefly but not the boycott, the latter of which is widely taken as a 
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sign that China’s public was awakening to national identity and the nation’s place in the geopolitical order of 
the time. e May 4 Movement gets a great deal of attention, in part because educational reformer John 
Dewey arrived in China on May 1, 1919, but the launch of the Chinese republic is passed over with scant 
notice. Scholars of Chinese history will have more to say about this timeline of Chinese nationalism.  
e modernity of Japan looks more familiar to a historian of U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and 
the Caribbean: “Like two sides of a coin, Japanese modernity consisted of universal ideas of liberation and 
progress on one side and on the other side the particularism of Japanese nationalism” (36). e fact that 
Japanese intellectuals grounded modernity in their country’s exceptionalism, justifying the annexation of 
Manchuria and Korea as necessary to jumpstart modernity there, has many echoes in the rationalizations of 
U.S. policy toward the Caribbean and Central America. If it is indeed sui generis, it is remarkably parallel to 
Western justifications for taking control of less-developed regions.  
So, cutting to the chase, does Davidann succeed in upholding the epiphany he experienced at Beijing airport?  
Do the antecedents he carefully traces out, from Yang Ming-ling to Fukuzawa Yukichi to Liang Qichao, 
explain why modernization has come so spectacularly to East Asia but not to all parts of the postcolonial 
world? As noted above, the intellectual tradition Davidann describes can appear to be more a question of 
reverse engineering than organic development.  Does it matter that, by working backward to build these 
intellectual antecedents, Davidann, like Fukuzawa and Hu before him, is essentially inventing tradition, 
retrofitting ideas to things, rather than demonstrating that ideas emerged from evolving facts on the ground? 
To state the question baldly, is there an essential difference between the genesis of intellectual modernity in 
the East and West?  Is it ultimately convincing that both American and East Asian intellectuals “created 
modernity,” as the book’s subtitle states? 
One way to answer that question would be to interrogate a single concept, civic virtue, which Davidann says 
intellectuals East and West both endorsed. In the West, as Joyce Appleby has shown, the idea of republican 
virtue, “the capacity to put the interests of the whole before one's self-interest,” has a very different 
relationship to modernity than does that concept in the East.1 In Europe and the United States, the notion of 
civic virtue lost ground to rival ideas of human nature intruding from the economic realm, by which the 
desire of ordinary people to better their condition came to be seen as the engine of economic progress and the 
foundation of democracy. at lineage runs from political economist Bernard Mandeville’s celebration of 
‘private vices’ giving ‘public benefits’2 and Adam Smith’s possessive individualism to the corporate raider 
Gordon Gekko’s assertion that ‘greed is good’ in the film Wall Street. In the Western case, ideas chased 
material reality.  
e doctrines Davidann describes do not seem to play the same role of explaining, justifying, and thus 
advancing new sorts of human relations that follow from new material conditions. Appleby notes that omas 
Jefferson’s proposition about equality piggy-backed on “a hundred-year old transformation of basic ideas 
about human nature and social order” which ultimately rested on the belief that “the economy rather than the 
                                                     
1 Joyce Appleby, “e Intellectual Underpinnings of American Democracy,” Daedalus 136:3 (Summer, 2007): 
14-23, 15.  
2 From Bernard Mandeville’s eighteenth century satire, e Fable of the Bees: Or Private Vices, Publick Benefits. 
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polity serves as the effective organizer of society.”3 Karl Marx famously described this process less gently when 
he wrote that the “fetters” of feudal society could not contain the emerging dynamic of capitalism: “ey had 
to burst asunder; they were burst asunder.”4 Despite the exceptional work Davidann has produced in e 
Limits of Westernization, this hidebound occidental is still not totally convinced that East Asians ‘burst 
asunder’ their own fetters.  
 
                                                     
3 Appleby, 14, 17.  
4 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Co., 1906), 
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Author’s Response by Jon Thares Davidann, Hawai’i Pacific University 
irst, a hearty thanks is due. I am deeply grateful to the four reviewers of e Limits of Westernization for 
their keen insights and to Dr. Peter Hoffenberg for introducing the forum. I learned a great deal from 
them, and I am delighted to be able to respond to their comments. But first a diversion. 
I am currently teaching an Honors course called Pacific Worlds, one that is apropos here in Hawai’i at the 
center of the Pacific Ocean. My students and I have been exploring the concept of the ‘Noble Savage.’ It is of 
course worlds away from United States-East Asian relations in the late nineteenth and first half of the 
twentieth century. Or is it? e Europeans’ romantic, mostly unrealistic view of Pacific Islanders, tinged with 
no little sense of superiority, a hope for civilization of those peoples balanced by skepticism that it could ever 
be accomplished, and a certainty that they would soon overtake these natives, dominated western thought. By 
comparison, in European and American views of late-nineteenth century East Asia, one can find plenty of 
romantics looking to the ‘Orient’ as an antidote to the cold wind of industrial life blowing through the West. 
e western attitude of racial superiority is well-documented in e Limits of Westernization as it is in many 
other books. Orientalists mourned the end of the Orient, just as modernists looked at East Asia and saw 
nations that must Occidentalize or die.  
Historians have relentlessly critiqued these assumptions since the 1960s, and yet, only in the most recent 
scholarship have they begun to explore what contact with westerners meant for Pacific Islanders. What we 
now know is that Pacific Islanders were no innocents; as bent on violence and destruction as any human 
civilization, they excelled the Europeans at mapping and navigation, they were exceedingly bright and 
knowledgeable about the Pacific Ocean (after all they thrived out in the middle of it for centuries), and Cook 
and others would not have survived without their help. Europeans and later Americans labored under these 
false assumptions into the twentieth century, all along the way misunderstanding and underestimating not 
just Pacific Islanders but also the peoples of the Pacific Rim in East Asia, assuming superiority and modern 
righteousness. As with Pacific Islanders, historians have begun to pull aside the veil obscuring the assumptions 
behind westernization in East Asia and to see East Asians more authentically. My hope is that e Limits of 
Westernization contributes to this process. 
e reviewers agree that we should study the limits of westernization and highlight the agency of East Asians, 
with the exception of Cyrus Veeser who admits as a non-specialist he might not be fully tuned in to the issues 
inhabiting East Asian studies. But it must be said that I am especially grateful for his insightful review; much 
knowledge can be obtained by looking outside one’s own specialty, and Veeser’s unique perspective among 
the reviewers offers fresh ideas. Beyond support for the book’s thesis, the reviews range widely over the 
landscape of United States-East Asian studies.  
Sarah Griffith’s review emphasizes the disruption by East Asians of the perceived trajectory of modernity as 
envisioned by American intellectuals. And yet I think she is a little too hard on them. Charles Beard, John 
Dewey, William James and many others struggled for modernity in their own spheres, many times with no or 
little achievement. eir lack of success and influence stemmed not so much from ignorance or arrogance as 
from the stubborn assumptions deeply imbedded in American thought, which they themselves fought to 
change. Griffith’s review also scans beyond influential intellectuals, wondering about East Asians other than 
intellectuals. e Limits of Westernization focuses on thought leaders and therefore spends little time on 
second-tier intellectuals or others. is approach has the advantage of answering the question of significance. 
e influence of these transnational intellectuals abounded. Fukuzawa Yukichi’s books were read aloud to 
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Japanese villagers, Dewey was the most celebrated philosopher of his generation, and Beard’s books were best 
sellers. My hope is that the book will stimulate research on broader societies through the lens created by e 
Limits of Westernization. I think we are at the front edge of this project.  
Connie Shemo’s effervescent review of e Limits of Westernization—I love the metaphor of a banquet with a 
host, attended by scholars from the various fields the book traverses—grasps the implications of my argument 
even in the organization of the book’s chapters. She notes the dialogic nature of American-East Asian 
intellectual exchange and ponders the process of “Easternization,” the obverse of Westernization. Shemo 
acknowledges that the focus of the book prevented me from undertaking a deeper study of East Asian 
influence in the West. Hopefully there is enough evidence in the book to tantalize scholars to undertake more 
research in this vein. e very thought of it excites me. It should be noted that Shemo’s own research has 
shown that Chinese female staff members at missionary hospitals took control of the institutions in the 
absence of steady missionary leadership. e limits of westernization were on display in this instance, but we 
simply did not care to notice until Shemo called our attention to them.1 
Tomoko Akami’s towering review reminds me of the heights one must climb in order to fully see the complex 
interaction of United States and East Asian intellectuals. Akami is an acute critic (and a long-time 
collaborator), and her endorsement is highly valued. I do think e Limits of Westernization establishes the 
various trajectories of modernity more clearly than she claims, as other reviewers in this forum point out. On 
her point that a number of East Asian intellectuals are not mentioned in the book, I can but restate my goal, 
which was to study major intellectuals whose influence would be relatively easy to establish and who deeply 
shaped American and East Asian modernities. e book strives for synthesis and makes no claims to cover 
every intellectual. 
Akami’s analysis of E.H Norman’s impact is most interesting. Norman’s book, Japan’s Emergence as a Modern 
State (1940), first published by the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR), was considered authoritative in the 
World War II period. After the book’s publication, he quickly fell out of grace, as did his volume during the 
postwar Red Scares in the United States and Canada. Accused of Communist connections, Norman 
committed suicide in Cairo by jumping out of his eighth-floor apartment building. e anti-Communist 
juggernaut also destroyed the IPR. American academics sought to rehabilitate Norman’s reputation in the 
1970s-1990s with studies of his life and work. It remains an open question, however, as to how much 
influence Norman exerted beyond academic historians. In the course of writing e Limits of Westernization, I 
had to disabuse myself of the notion that what academics said or wrote within their communities was 
automatically worthy of study. is reflexive and isolating sensibility has plagued academic scholarship in 
recent decades. I took my marching orders from the great narrative historian Charles Beard in deliberately 
writing e Limits of Westernization for as large an audience as possible in order to overcome this insularity.  
e other issue of the influence of prewar Japanese Marxists is a complicated one which I do address in the 
book. Most Marxists sat out the 1930s in jail, arrested for proposing that the imperial institution be 
eliminated from the Japanese political system. But there was another route to radicalism in Japan, one which 
was much more successful. Pan-Asianists such as intellectual Kita Ikki blended Marxism into their analysis of 
                                                     
1 Connie Shemo, “’Her Chinese Attended to Almost Everything’’: Relationships of Power in the Hackett 
Medical College for Women, Guangzhou, China, 1901-1915".” Journal of American-East Asian Relations 24:4 (2017), 
321-346. 
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Asians for Asia. Kita Ikki was hounded by the government, his books banned, and eventually he was executed 
for his efforts. But those who read his works (before they were banned) and others became very influential 
supporters of Japanese empire as a source of liberation for all Asians. In Kita’s vision, absolute control by the 
Emperor (and the militarists who spoke in his name) would extend to industrial capitalism in Japan. 
Successful imperial expansion led eventually to the Sino-Japanese War and the Pacific War. At home, the 
most extreme militarists were arrested and executed (alongside Kita Ikki) after the February 1936 failed coup. 
Capitalists survived by cooperating with the government and the military, building the tools of the lethal 
Japanese war machine. e book also spends much space covering Marxists in China, including Li Dazhao, 
Lu Xun (with Marxist leanings), and Mao Zedong. It should be noted that all of these intellectuals actively 
adapted Marxism to the Chinese context. 
I am in almost complete agreement with Akami on her other point that Japan’s “welfare liberalism,” as she 
refers to it—along with thought leaders in Japan—can explain the complex position of these Japanese 
intellectuals vis-à-vis the Japanese state. ese actors have been previously studied by both Akami and myself, 
in addition to many others, to unlock the mystery of why liberals in prewar Japan seemed to blithely support 
emperor and empire.2 But the real puzzle here is why Akami in her review cordons these intellectuals off from 
modernity. ey actively sought modernity; their modern thought, reworked again and again, pursued an 
alternate liberation, away from the stifling influence of western political hegemony, although one that was in 
favor of a benign regional Japanese hegemony which would ultimately liberate all of East Asia. ey were in 
favor of social amelioration and political engagement for the Japanese masses, and, during World War II, a 
few of them condemned the very concept of westernization as slavery. Westerners at the time argued these 
views demonstrated Japanese modernity was nothing but a façade; it became proof positive that Japan was not 
modern after all, because it had turned away from westernization. e Limits of Westernization recovers these 
Japanese intellectuals’ modernity, despite denials from prewar American experts on East Asia. Akami 
articulates as well a related point that this position was not unique to Japan. roughout the world in the 
1930s, liberal intellectuals made their peace with national power and trekked over hill and vale to come closer 
to the state. 
In spite of its reticence about e Limits of Westernization’s thesis, Cyrus Veeser’s review delights. It is so well-
written with superb insights that I am tempted to stop typing, close my computer, and declare it a ‘job well-
done.’ But Veeser brings up some crucial issues that deserve a thoughtful response. To Veeser’s assertion that I 
am inventing tradition, like Fukuzawa and Chinese intellectual Hu Shih, I am in complete agreement, at least 
to the extent that all historians are interpreters, not fact-givers. We interrogate the past to see what it can offer 
us, and do not simply compile and accumulate facts and ideas. But it is also true that I did not intend to write 
a book about the limits of westernization when I started researching the topic of modernity in United States-
East Asian relations. It came to me through the research. I actually resisted it for some time; it was too 
controversial, it would cause trouble, I would be cast out as a crank. 
                                                     
2 See Tomoko Akami. Internationalizing the Pacific: e United States and Japan, and the Institute of Pacific 
Relations in War and Peace (London: Routledge Press, 2002); Jon ares Davidann, Cultural Diplomacy in U.S.-Japanese 
Relations, 1919-1941. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Sheldon Garon. Molding Japanese Minds: e State in 
Everyday Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Jung-Sun N. Han, An Imperial Path to Modernity: Yoshino 
Sakuzō and a New Liberal Order in East Asia, 1905-1937. Harvard East Asian Monographs 346. (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Asia Center, 2012). 
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Veeser challenges the notion that East Asians were the authors of their own modern destiny. Instead he 
proposes that they confronted an intellectual world made material by the overwhelming influence of western 
industrialization in which it became impossible to construct civic duty outside of the influence of capitalist 
ideas. is daunting assertion has so much relevance for our politics and culture today that the possibility that 
Veeser is right makes me shiver with fright. Interestingly, both Japanese and Chinese intellectuals attempted 
to establish in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century a distinction between the rampant materialism 
of the West and the spiritual emphasis of the East. Other Asians, including the Indian intellectual 
Rabindranath Tagore, did the same. e distinction proved to be problematic, but it was on the minds of 
East Asians as they confronted the “dynamic of capitalism” as Veeser (and Karl Marx) described it. ere can 
be no doubt the West exerted a powerful pull. But the West also produced a repugnance and fear that 
motivated many Asian intellectuals to construct an alternate to westernized modernity. e influence of 
westernization is undeniable, but it was not as totalizing as we have assumed. For this reason, the book is 
entitled e Limits of Westernization, not ‘e Myth of Westernization’ or some similar name.  
When considering the western threat, East Asian intellectuals grappled with their own intellectual traditions. 
As much as some intellectuals attempted to jettison Confucianism and its variants, its attractions, especially in 
a world given over to industrial infrastructure and profit margins, became very clear indeed. e exposition of 
the ethical good and the definition of civic duty in Confucianism allowed East Asians to construct a response 
and build a nationalist modernity in which capitalists such as Shibusawa Eiichi had a duty to the state and his 
fellow Japanese, not just to his bottom line. In retirement, Shibusawa supported literally hundreds of charities 
and gave generously of his time, serving on boards and committees. He committed substantial resources to 
the rebuilding of Tokyo after the Kanto Earthquake. It did not always work this way; certainly there were 
selfish capitalists, but the expectation of civic duty was powerful. East Asian thought leaders confronted 
western capitalism, but their responses helped to shape a distinctive modernity in East Asia. ere were also 
American capitalists who became quite civic-minded. Andrew Carnegie, the ruthless robber baron, build 
libraries and took up the cause of anti-imperialism in his retirement. It could be that the historian Joyce 
Appleby sees the divide between acquisitive, self-seeking capitalism and civic duty in terms too stark. 
To conclude, I offer a story. I gave a keynote lecture in Istanbul last summer just before the book appeared in 
print. e audience, composed of local Turkish scholars and graduate students from around the world, 
responded in a bifurcated manner to the main ideas of e Limits of Westernization, which in turn reaffirmed 
the need for the argument of the book. Several graduate students argued the very word ‘westernization’ should 
be expunged from the English language. On the other hand, a Turkish scholar stood to rebut this assertion 
with the argument that westernization was ‘the story’ of Turkish modernity. I stood in between, arguing the 
term westernization had to stay because the process is an historical reality and at the same time pointing out 
historians’ exaggeration of its power.  
